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Civil Actions For Damages Arising out
of Violations of Civil Rights
By NATHANEL S. CoLLEY*
THE continuing drama of the civil rights movement during the
decade since the rendition of the school desegregation cases' has un-
questionably been as much the main attraction on the American scene
as was the issue of Negro slavery between Dred Scott2 and emancipa-
tion.3 Now, as then, the courtroom is one of the main theaters in which
that drama is staged. This is both natural and proper, since under our
system of government we seek implementation of the rule of law in
our relationships between each other and with the state. Not only do
the courts interpret existing law, but they often make it. While it is
true that this latter function is often decried, and charges of usurpation
of the legislative function are leveled,4 the fact remains that the courts
are mandated by equitable principles, often codified into statutory
commands,5 to fashion a remedy for every wrong.6 Since precedent
plays such a vital role in our legal system, every time a court fashions
a remedy for a wrong it, of necessity, is making a new law in the true
sense of the word.
Civil actions for damages for violation of civil rights have been
founded upon federal statutes,7 state statutory provisions," and com-
mon law principles.9 It will be the purpose of this article to explore and
0 B.S., 1941, Tuskegee Institute; LL.B., 1948, Yale University; Member, Californa
Bar. Counsel, Western Region, NAACP.1 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
S Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln, effective Jan. 1, 1863.
4 See Muskoff v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 222, 359 P.2d 457, 463, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1961), Schauer, J., dissenting: "[Tioday's majority apparently im-
patient with the Legislature's failure to act as speedily and as comprehensively as they
believe it should, usurp the legislative function "
5 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3523 provides: "For every wrong there is a remedy."
6"No right can exist, in contemplation of law, that cannot be injured, and there can
be no injury without a remedy." Merced Mining Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 130, 133 (1857).
7 REv. STAT. §§ 1977-80 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-85 (1965).
8 The relief afforded by state civil rights acts is by no means uniform. Some of them,
though by their terms penal in nature, still allow an action for damages sounding in tort.
Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Co., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W 241 (1927); Everett
v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955). Others provide that a stated penalty
must be paid to the victim, and in Indiana this has been held to be an exclusive remedy.
Bailey v. Washington Theater Co., 218 Ind. 513, 34 N.E.2d 17 (1941).
9 Some states, including California, take the position that even in the absence of
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comment upon the use of such actions in civil rights cases. California
Civil Code sections 51 and 52 will be considered to illustrate the use
of state statutes. A few old and new California cases will be examined
to illustrate the use of common law principles. United States Code,
title 42, sections 1981-85, will be discussed with reference to federal
remedies.
Historical Background
In 1893 the California Legislature enacted a statute prohibiting
racial discrimination m places of public accommodation."0 It was de-
signed to give a specific civil remedy to individuals whose right to be
free from racial discrimination was infringed by other private persons.
It is also probable that it resulted in part from the fact that an earlier
criminal statute"' making it a misdemeanor for a common carrier or
innkeeper to fail to receive and transport or entertain any guest had
received little or no enforcement. As is the case with all criminal
statutes, enforcement rests with the discretion of the public prosecutor,
and evidently the discrimination sought to be interdicted here is not
the type which sets law enforcement officers off on a crusade.
A California civil rights case involving a damage action against a
railway company was decided in 186812 and another against an inn-
keeper was decided in May, 1891.13 Neither made reference to a statute
of any kind. Counsel for each party and the court seemed to take it for
granted that an innkeeper and a railway company had a common law
duty to receive, entertain or transport, without regard to race or color,
all who sought use of their facilities.
Between the years 1905 and 1959, Civil Code sections 51-54 con-
stituted Califorma's civil rights legislation. These were revised in 1959
in ways to be discussed subsequently A new statute establishing a right
to maintain a civil action for damages for racial discrimination in
publicly assisted housing was also added at that time. 4 The 1963
statutory command, the courts have a common law duty to protect citizens from unfair
racial discnmnation. James v. Mannship Corporation, 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329
(1944). In Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 590, 165 P.2d
903, 905 (1946) the court said, "it is established that, where persons are subjected to
certain conduct by others which is deemed unfair and contrary to public policy, the
courts have full power to afford necessary protection m the absence of statute."
10 Cal. Stat. 1893, ch. 185, at 220.
11 CAL. PEN. CODE § 365.
12 Pleasants v. North Beach & Mission R.R., 34 Cal. 586 (1868). See also Turner v.
North Beach & Mission R.R., 34 Cal. 594 (1866).
13 Willis v. McMahan, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891).
14 CAL. HEALTH' & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-44.
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legislature supplied administrative machinery for enforcement of the
right to be free from discrimination m private housing operated on a
commercial basis, 5 but this and other such laws, as they related to
housing discrimination, were nullified by the initiative constitutional
amendment called Proposition 14,16 which was adopted by a two-to-
one vote of the people at the general election m November, 1964.17
California Civil Code sections 51-54, came under attack by civil
rights groups in the late fifties as a part of the demand for more effec-
tive antidiscrnnation legislation. The NAACP 8 joined m the demand
for revision, and its regional officers worked closely with Speaker
Unrua and his staff in drafting the Unruh Civil Rights Act.'9 The
primary cause of the disenchantment of civil rights leaders and groups
with sections 51-54 was the number of exceptions to their coverage.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that the courts had, in
several cases decided in the years 1950-58, exhibited a strong tendency
to pay only lip service to the rule of liberal construction of these
15 CAL. HEALTH & SA= CODE §§ 35710, 35720, 35730-38 and CAL. LABOn
CODE §§ 1410-32 ("Rumford Ace').
16 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
17 Seven actions challenging the constitutionality of CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26 were
taken under submission by the California Supreme Court after oral arguments on October
25, 1965. Most of the challengers asserted, inter alia, that the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States prohibits Califoria from rendering its courts and
agencies impotent to act when claims of racial discrimination are asserted. The view was
repeatedly expressed that the state courts must entertain and adjudicate such Claims, and
if the evidence in any case shows that the sole basis of the discrimination is race or color
the courts must not refuse to allow their processes to be used to defeat such a purpose.
This argument seems to find support in Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962), where the court held that an affirmative defense
of racial discrimination must be entertained in an eviction suit in order to avoid violation
of the fourteenth amendment.
In an original proceeding in the California Supreme Court (Lewis v. Jordan, Sac.
No. 7549, June 3, 1964) an effort was made to mandate the California Secretary of
State to keep Proposition 14 off the ballot because it violated the fourteenth amendment,
covered more than one subject in violation of CAL. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1 c, and that it would
revise rather than amend the California constitution. While that effort was not successful,
two members of the Court (Justices Peters and Tobrmer) dissented from the denial of
the writ of mandate, and the other five justices joined in an unusual order which ex-
pressed grave doubt of the constitutionality of the proposed initiative, but said they felt
that the issue could be better passed upon after the election when the proposal actually
became a part of the state constitution. In taking this position the court was simply
following the rule adopted by it in Wind v. Hite, 58 Cal. 2d 415, 24 Cal. Rptr. 683, 374
P.2d 643 (1962).
18 Support of a bill to strengthen these sections was a part of the NAACP's legisla-
tive goals for 1959.
10 The author served as regional attorney for the NAACP and personally participated
in these discussions.
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statutes as announced in Evans v. Fong Poy20 and Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, Inc.21
In the place and stead of the liberal construction rule, there was
imported from other ]urisdictions22 a test based upon whether the place
or activity sought to be regulated is like the places specified in the
statute. In modem times, the court found the requisite likeness only in
Lambert v. Manders of California,8 involving the asserted right of a
retail shoe store to exclude Negroes. The store claimed to be distin-
guishable from the places and facilities enumerated in the statute. In
answer to this, the appellate court, in reversing the trial court, ob-
served. "A retail shoe store is a place of public accommodation that is
essentially like a place where ice cream and soft drnks are sold; each
is open to the public generally for the purchase of goods." 24
On the other hand, in Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn.,25
a cemetery was found not to be regulated, because it was not like any
of the enumerated facilities. The view was also expressed that the
statutes contemplated only living persons20 and did not protect any
rights of the dead. Thus, it was said, none of the rights of a Negro
widow were violated by defendant's refusal to permit the burial of her
husband m the section reserved for white people.
Since the "like places" doctrine had been accepted as the governing
20 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941). "Such sweeping language as that
italicized obviously covers public bars and saloons." Id. at 321, 108 P.2d at 943.
2130 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947). Here it was contended that the statutes in
question are in derogation of the common law and hence must be strictly construed. In
applying the rule of liberal construction the court quoted CAL. Crv. CODE: § 4 m support
of its view. That section requires liberal construction of the Civil Code with the view
toward effecting its objects and promoting justice.
22 In Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 278
P.2d 945, 946 (1955), the court cited an Illinois case, People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest
Home Cemetery Co., 258 Ill. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913), and an Iowa case, Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W 2d 110 (1953), as authority for
its conclusion that "the settled rule of law is that the expression 'all other places' means
all other places of a like nature to those enumerated, i.e., 'restaurants, hotels' etc." The
subsequent cases of Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887,
338 P.2d 633 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1959), and Gardner v. Vic Tanny
Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960), repeat the claim that
the rule is well settled.
23 156 Cal. App. 2d 855, 319 P.2d 469 (1957).
24 Id. at 857, 319 P.2d at 470.
25 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 328, 278 P.2d 945, (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1955).
26 Id. at 329. (Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Kaufnan). The three Justices of
the District Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint,
but each wrote a separate opinion, and not one of them joined in the views expressed
by the others.
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rule, the result of the case is logical, but on the question of rights
of the living versus the rights of the dead it is indefensible. Obviously,
the right attempted to be asserted was the plaintiff's right to bury her
husband in dignity and respect, not the husband's right to be so buried.
The widow was under a duty imposed by California law27 to inter the
body of her dead husband, and it follows that she had a right to per-
form this duty m a cemetery His burial elsewhere than in a cemetery
within the limits of a city or county would be a misdemeanor.2 8 The
real question, never reached by any of the three opinions of the court,
was whether the widow had a right to perform a duty imposed by law
in a manner wich did not impose upon her the humiliation of racial
discrimination. The comment by Justice Kaufman to the effect that
"plaintiff was not denied the right to enter the cemetery but was merely
refused permission to bury her husband in the cemetery"29 was trite,
to say the least. For what purpose other than to attend the burial ritual
or to visit the interred does a normal person ordinarily enter a ceme-
tery? The remark of the Honorable Justice makes no more sense in its
context than it would have if he had said that a Negro housewife
should not complain of being denied the right to make purchases, so
long as she has not been prevented from entering a store.3°
In Coleman v. Middlestaff,3' it was held that a dental office was not
like the places enumerated in the statute, and hence the services of a
dentist could not be coerced by legal action. Again, instead of adhering
to the California rule of liberal construction announced in Orloff,"2 the
court chose to follow the rule announced m another junsdiction.33
Reed v. Hollywood Professonal School3P4 sustained the exclusion,
solely on the basis of her race, of a five-year-old Negro girl from a
27 CAL. HE.m & SAFTrY CODE § 7100.
28 CAL. HEArTH & SA.-ETY CODE § 7054.
29 Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 278 P.2d
945, 946 (1955).
30 Lambert v. Mandel's of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 319 P.2d 469 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1957), where the right to purchase shoes m a retail store
was sustained.
31 147 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1957).32 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
33 The court relied upon Rice v. Rinaldo, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657
(Oluo App. 1951). It also cited 41 Am. JuR. Physicians & Surgeons § 4 (1942), which
states that m the absence of statute a dentist does not have to serve all who come to hun.
This hardly helps, because there was a statute m Coleman, and the question was whether
it was applicable.
34169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 633 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1959).
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private school. The court said that a school is not a place like those
enumerated in the statute.
Exclusion of Negroes from facilities of a health gymnasium was
sustained in Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc.,35 on the ground that
the evidence showed the place not to be one of public accommodation.
The determinative factor was that admission was allegedly by member-
ship only, even though newspaper advertisements invited everyone
from "eight to eighty" to telephone for a "guest card" and use the
facilities on the theory that he was trying out for membership.3 6 It may
readily be seen that if the exclusion of Negroes could be effected in any
establishment by such practices, the civil rights statutes would soon
become inpotent as devices for the coercion of non-discrimnation by
those determined to exclude Negroes. It would not be too difficult for a
restaurant to apply these techniques and become an eating club. The
corner saloon would become a driking club. Inevitably, civil rights
laws would become more honored in the breach than in the observance.
It was the purpose of the Unruh Civil Bights Act to nullify the
limited, restrictive interpretations of prior law.
The Unruh Civil Rights Act
In 1959 the California Legislature re-wrote Civil Code sections 51
and 52 and repealed sections 53 and 54.a ' The two remaining sections,
by command of the legislature expressed in the statute itself, "shall
be known, and may be cited as the Unruh Civil Bights Act."' It
provides as follows:
Section 51.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal,
and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
land whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege
35182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960).
36 But af. Askew v. Parker, 151 Cal. App. 2d 759, 312 P.2d 342 (1957), interpret-
ing the scope of CAL. HEALTH & SAFI,= CODE §§ 24100-09 defining public swimming
pools and requiring their inspection. The pool in question was held to be public, even
though its use was restricted to teen-age children who registered pursuant to an invita-
tion extended to them. The determining factor on the question of whether it was public
or not was said to be whether large numbers of people used the pool as a result of a
general invitation, as opposed to limited use by a few people on specific occasions.
Manifestly, this is a different test from that applied in the Vic Tanny case.
37 CAL. STAT. 1959, ch. 1866, at 4424.
38 CAL. Crv. CODE § 51.
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on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is
applicable alike to persons of every color, race, religion, ancestry or
national origin.
Section 52.
Whoever demes, or who aids, or incites such demal, or whoever
makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of
color, race, religion, ancestry or national origin, contrary to the
provisions of Section 51 of this code, s liable for each and every such
offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250)
in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided
in Section 51 of this code.
The language of the Unruh Civil Rights Act was intentionally made
broad enough to nullify the restrictions placed upon the prior law by
the courts' requirement that the place or facility sought to be covered
be a "place of public accommodation" in the very technical or tradi-
tional sense of the word as applied in the Reed and Vic Tanny cases.
By substituting the phrase "business establishment of any kind whatso-
ever" for the former "place of public accommodation" the legislature
evidently intended that the new test be simply whether the enterprise
in question as commercial in nature. Presumptively at least, it knew that
the word "business" had been defined by the courts as embracing any-
thing an which one as engaged for the purpose of earning a living or
making a profit. 9 It is true that only business conducted in an "estab-
lishment" was regulated, but this word posed no great restriction be-
cause it includes not only an enterprise at a fixed location but also any
permanent commercial force or orgamzaton. 40
The new terminology of the statute would certainly nullify the
precedent established by the earlier exoneration of the dentist who
refused to treat a Negro patient.41 In fact, the statute encompasses all
the healing arts, for years earlier it was held in another context that
the practice of medicine is a business.42 The case of Washington v.
Blampzn4O applied section 51, as amended, to the practice of medicine
39 City of Los Angeles v. Cohen, 124 Cal. App. 2d 225, 268 P.2d 183 (1954).
40While the phrase, "business establishment" had no particular legal meaning at the
time of the adoption of § 51 in 1959, its meaning, if not one of common knowledge,
could have been ascertained from any standard English language dictionary by ascer-
taming the meanings of business and establishment separately. This was done in Swam
v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 694, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286, 292 (1962).
41 The dentist was held not to be covered in Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1957).
42 Crutchett v. Lawton, 139 Cal. App. 411, 33 P.2d 839 (1934).
43226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964). Here, a father sought damages
for refusal of medical services to his child. The child also sought damages. The trial
court's judgment on the pleadings for defendant was reversed.
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and specifically held that both a child, who was denied treatment,
and her father, who had sought treatment for her, could maintain a
cause of action against the offending physician. The defendant had
urged that it was impossible for the father to have a cause of action
because he had not sought treatment for himself, and the refusal to
treat the infant daughter could not result mn legal harm to the father.
The right of the father to sue was sustained on the theory that he had
a duty to provide medical care for ls minor daughter which defendant
had allegedly agreed to furnish. Thus, the refusal constituted a denial
of the right of the father to the services of the physician, preventing
the father from performing his legal duty
The allegation that the defendant physician agreed with the father
that he would furnish the services might have supported an action for
breach of the agreement. Nevertheless, both father and daughter
should be allowed to sue in tort because each has been independently
wronged by the denial. The wrong to the patient is obvious, and what-
ever she can show by way of damage under traditional principles of
tort law would be the measure of her recovery The wrong to the father
would consist in the unlawful frustration of his duty to provide medical
care for his child. Again, the rules of tort law should govern the
measure of damages. In the case of serious harm to a minor proximately
resulting from the failure of a doctor to render medical care, the father
may also have a cause of action for loss of the earnings of the minor
during minority44 and past and future medical expenses. 45
The Supreme Court of California removed all possible doubt con-
cernmg the all-inclusive nature of the language n the present sec-
tion 51 in Burks v. Poppy Constr Co.,46 which extended coverage to the
activity of selling tract homes in a subdivision, and in Lee v. O'Hara,47
which embraced the functions of a real estate broker. In Burks the
court observed.
The Legislature used the words "all" and "of every kind whatso-
ever" in referring to business establishments covered by the Unruh
44 Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 275 Pac. 840 (1929). CAL. CIv. CODE § 197
provides that the parents of a legitimate unmarried minor are entitled to his earnings.
CAL. Crv. COD.E § 200 provides that the mother is entitled to the earnings of an tn-
married illegitimate minor. See also, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 376.
45 A parent may sue for past and future medical expenses of his child m the same
action in which damages for injury to the child are sought. Such a suit may be brought
by the parent in his own right irrespective of his appearance as guardian ad litem for
the child in a separate suit. Bauman v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. App. 2d 144, 108 P.2d
989 (1940); Large v. Williams, 154 Cal. App. 2d 315, 315 P.2d 919 (1957).
4657 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
47 57 Cal. 2d 476, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617, 370 P.2d 321 (1962).
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Act (Civil Code § 51), and the inclusion of these words, without
any exception and without specification of particular lands of enter-
prises, leaves no doubt that the term "business establishments" was
used in the broadest sense reasonably possible.48
The language of coverage in the Unruh Act is so broad that it is
difficult, to say the least; to think of a commercial activity not covered.
It must be kept in mind, however, that as of this writing no state law
may be used to interfere with the right of an owner of real property in
Califorma to decline to sell or rent it to any person in has absolute
discretion.49 It is asserted by some,80 and conceded by others5 ' that
California Constitution, article 1, section 26, does not prohibit use of
the Rumford Act 52 to prevent or make actionable housing discramina-
tion on the basis of race or color by real estate brokers and lending
institutions.
The broad language of Proposition 14 did not resolve the issue
beyond question. It provides in part as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly the right of any person, who is
willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part of his real property,
to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons
as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Person includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other
legal entities and their agents and representatives
It would certainly be reasonable to argue that once a broker accepts
a listing from an owner he becomes an agent or representative of that
4857 Cal. 2d 463, 468, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611, 370 P.2d 313, 315 (1962).
4 9 CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 26, an initiative constitutional amendment adopted as
Proposition 14 at the November 1964 general election.
50 The California Fair Employment Practices Commission takes tlus view. It has con-
tinued to entertain complaints against real estate brokers on the theory that racial dis-
crimmation by a broker is not protected by art. 1, § 26 unless he is merely carrying out
the orders of the owner.
51 Brief of California Real Estate Association and Respondents in pending California
Supreme Court cases Mulkey v. Reitman, L.A. No. 28360; Hill v. Miller, Sac. No. 7657;
Pendergast v. Snyder, L.A. No. 28422; Peyton v. Barrington Plaza Corp., L.A. No. 28449;
Thomas v. Goulias, S.F No. 22019; Grogan v. Meyer, S.F No. 22120; Fresno Redevel-
opment Agency v. Buckman, S.F 22017. On page 15 of the brief the following appears:
"If valid, Section 26 nullified such causes of action as arose under the Unruh and Rum-
ford Acts for refusal to sell or rent property based upon race, color, or creed, though it
has not nullified causes of action under those Acts against such as brokers, mortgage
lenders, and all other persons other than the particular property owner involved."
52 CAL. HEALTH & SAF, uaY CODE §§ 35710-44, and CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-32.
These sections prohibit racial and religious discrimination m the sale or rental of all
publicly assisted housing containing four or more units, and in all other housing facilities,
regardless of number of units, operated so as to come within the business establishment
coverage of CAL. Crv. CODE § 51.
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owner and as such is protected in his discrminatory activities by the
explicit terms of the amendment. A reasonably sound argument could
also be made to the effect that action against a broker would be an
indirect method of abridging or limiting the right of an owner. This
becomes almost a compelling view when it is considered that the
constitution extends the right to practice racial discrimination to "per-
sons" and proceeds to define that word as including agents and repre-
sentatives.
Yet it is true that the word "person" as used in the first section is
limited to those persons who desire to sell or rent their real property,
and hence the word as used m the second section may not give an
agent or representative any independent mimunization from state
prohibitions and may cover him only to the extent that he is acting in
the capacity of agent for a person who owns property Tins view would
also require that any discraimation by him be done within the course
and scope of hs authority
In Vargas v. Hampson,53 a person of Mexican ancestry sued a real
estate broker on a charge of racial discrimination in refusing to sell a
house to him. There was no suit against the owner and no specific
allegation that the defendant broker had independent authority to sell
the house. A general demurrer on the ground that the complaint did
not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and
special demurrers for lack of clarity in the complaint were sustained
by the trial court, with leave to plaintiff to amend the pleadings. This,
however, plaintiff refused to do, and on appeal to the California Su-
preme Court the resulting judgment of dismissal was affirmed.54
The most significant aspect of the Vargas case 55 is that the court
took pains to establish good faith as a defense by a broker charged with
prohibited discrimination. It announced the following rule:
In some circumstances, of course, both a broker and an owner may
be guilty of discrimination, but a broker who in good faith does all
within his power to serve a member of a racial minority is not liable
if the broker's failure to complete the transaction is due solely to the
owner's refusal to sell because of the buyer's race or color.5
The trouble with the foregoing rule is that it covered a matter the
court, in a legal sense, could not reach on the record before it. The
53 57 Cal. 2d 479, 20 Cal. Rptr. 618, 370 P.2d 322 (1962).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Id. at 481, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 620, 370 P.2d at 324.
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broker had not answered the complaint, and hence hIs good faith or
lack of it was not an issue unless the court meant that hereafter a
plaintiff must plead absence of good faith before he may proceed
against a broker. Criticism of the decision in Vargas has been voiced
heretofore.57 It is submitted that in the face of allegations of failure to
offer services because of race or color, it should be incumbent upon a
real estate broker to plead and prove his good faith, or to put it another
way, that the charge is not true.
Where a broker accepts a listing and by its terms or by a collateral
oral agreement consents to a demand of the owner not to offer his
services in connection with the property to members of certain mi-
nority groups, the broker should be held liable even if sued alone. In
effect, he would be a co-conspirator with the owner, and there is no
reason why all who commit a wrong must be sued. Even though legal
action against the owner is not possible because the property in ques-
tion is not covered by the Unruh Act or the Rumford Act, the liabilities
of the owner and the agent are several, not joint. Of necessity, it must
be assumed that the attacks upon the constitutionality of article 1
section 2658 might not succeed.5 9
Prior to the adoption of article 1 section 26, civil actions for dam-
ages could be maintained under the Hawkins Act." In 1963 the legisla-
ture adopted the Rumford Act which was essentially an amendment
of the 1959 Fair Employment Practices Act61 which provided for com-
mission enforcement of the Hawkins Act and the Unruh Act to the
extent that the latter dealt with housing discrimiation. It appears that
no cases were decided under the Rumford Act because of the interven-
tion of article 1 section 26.
There are numerous other civil rights statutes in Califorma, but the
rights created or defined by some of them appear to be subject to
57Colley & McGhee, California and Washngton Fair Housing Cases, 22 LAw i
TANsrrioN 79 (1962).
58 See authority cited note 51 supra.
r)9 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 26 would certainly seem to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. By it, the state has rendered itself unable to protect a right of national citizenslp,
the right to own and rent real property. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1892). It demes those who may be discriinnated against in the use and ownership
of real property a remedy for such wrongs. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). It deies
equal protection in many ways. See briefs cited note 51 supra.
60 CAL. HEArTH & SAErY CODE § 35710-44. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal.
2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962), was brought under both the Unruh
Act CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 and the Hawkins Act CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720.61 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1410-32.
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exclusively administrative enforcement, 62 and others cover areas m
which there has been no litigation.63
Pleading, Proof and Damages
Since the types of actions we have discussed thus far are purely
statutory, any complaint should conform to the language of the statute
involved. At a mmimum, the complaint should state:
(1) The racial identity of the plaintiff. An allegation that "plaintiff
is a member of an ethmc group commonly known and referred to as
Negroes" will suffice.
(2) The identity of the statute. While under our liberal system of
pleading this is not a requirement, it seems desirable. This is especially
true, and may be necessary, where two different statutes, providing
different measures of damages, may be involved.64 The allegation may
simply be: "That sections 51 and 52, Califorma Civil Code, provide as
follows:," followed by the sections verbatim.
(3) Specific conduct of each defendant sought to be charged show-
ing violation of the statute. For example:
That at all times mentioned hereto defendants, and each of them,
owned and operated a certain business establishment at 1615-99th
Street, Sacramento, California, wherein food and drink are sold to the
public; that on Or about October 31, 1965 plaintiff entered said
establishment to purchase food and drink, but solely because of the
race or color of plaintiff, defendants, and each of them, refused to
sell the same to plaintiff, thereby humiliating plaintiff and causing him
62 CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 13274 and 13732 prohibit discrimination in the employment
of teachers and those appointed to classified positions, but there is no nght to bring a
civil action. Commission enforcement is the soeredy. CAL. GovT CODE §§ 8400,
19702, 19704 are designed to prohibit discrimination in ivil service. CAL. LABOR CODE
§§ 1735, 1777.6 prohibit discrimination in employment on ublic works, and CAL. LABOR
CODE §§ 1410-32 prohibit discrimination in employment me general. All covered employ-
ment discrimination is handled exclusively by the public ,agencies involved or the Fair
Employment Commission.
63 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 53, 782 adopted in 1961, make xestnctive covenants void but
presuppose the necessity of a judicial action to declare this fact in any given case. CAL.
Crv. CODE § 69 and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10350 prohibit inquiry concerning
the racial identity of those seeking marriage licenses. CAL. EDuC. CODE: § 8451 prohibits
reflection by a teacher or any entertainment at a school upon any person because of race
or color. This raises a serious question concerning the legality of blackface mnimstrel
shows as a part of school entertainment. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 8452 requires that text books
not reflect upon any person because of his race.
64 This was the situation in Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962). Both the Unruh Act and the Hawkins Act applied. The
Unruh Act provided for a $250 minimum, whereas the minimum in the Hawkins Act was
$500.
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great emotional and nervous upset, all to his damage in the sum of
$__ dollars.
In every case an additional paragraph should allege that the con-
duct of defendants was intentional and oppressive, that it was done
with the intent to vex, annoy and humiliate plaintiff, and that it was
of such a nature that defendants should be made an example of for the
public good by the imposition of punitive damages.
The prayer for relief should seek whatever actual damages have
been suffered, any statutory penalty provided, and, in every case,
punitive damages. While some defendants in a particular case might
not exhibit the personal culpability required for the nposition of
punitive damages, nevertheless, m nearly every such case, someone has
intended to discriminate because of race or color. This intent should
be sufficient for imposition of punitive damages under California Civil
Code section 3294, which provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual
damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.
The question is frequently asked whether, in the ordinary civil
rights case involving only a refusal to fuirmsh goods or services, there
are any actual damages suffered. The answer to that question is al-
most always answered in the affirmative by Negroes. Such a refusal
usually constitutes an abrupt, traumatic confrontation with a form
of racial segregation. It was stated in Brown v. Board of Educ.,5 "to
separate them (Negro children) from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
The harm from rejection of a person in some essential service
solely because of race is equally devastating and enduring when in-
flicted upon adults.66 In light of this, the view our courts have taken
05347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
06 About 15 years ago the writer and his family were refused the right to purchase
sandwiches and milkshakes on a hot summer day m a small town in the San Joaquin
Valley. To tius day, none of us has been able to forget the feelings of initial humiliation
and subsequent outrage we experienced. Whenever I drive through that town even now
I have a feeling of insecurity and resentment upon approaching it and of relief and
pleasure upon leaving it behind. We did or ebuYf emotional harm is damage, our
actual damages were substantial. Subs antial compensatory damages may be awarded
for emotional upset caused by an mtentional tort. Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App.
2d 709, 19 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1961).
December, 1965] CIVIL RIGHTS DAMAGES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
on the question of damages in such cases is close to scandalous, be-
cause a substantial award is almost never made. Most of these cases
do not reach the appellate court level, but enough is known about them
to substantiate the point.
In Thomas v. Goulias,17 an obviously sensitive, refined, well edu-
cated Negro woman was denied the rental of an apartment solely
because of her race. In her suit under the Unruh Act a municipal
court Jury awarded her 1000 dollars compensatory damages and
250 dollars statutory damages. On motion for a new trial the Hon.
Albert A. Axelrod determined that the puny award of 1000 dollars
was excessive and ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff would agree
to have that amount reduced to 250 dollars. He offered to allow the
statutory 250 dollars stand, making the total amount of 500 dollars.
The plaintiff refused to accept the reduction and a new trial was
ordered.
No new trial has been had because, after the adoption of article 1
section 26, California Constitution, the defendant's motion to dismiss
the case was granted on the theory that state courts no longer have
authority to prevent racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real
property If that section is held unconstitutional, however, and upon
a new trial of the action substantial damages are awarded, there is
no reason to expect that a new judge will see the case in a different
light, unless the evidence on the damage question is substantial and
dramatic.
In Duff v. Engelberg 8 the trial court found that the defendants,
solely because plaintiff-purchaser was a Negro, intentionally and mal-
'iciously induced one McCoy to refuse to carry out a contract to sell
real property Compensatory damages in the sum of 1000 dollars and
500 dollars punitive damages were awarded. When one considers the
legitimate interest plaintiff- had in securing a home for himself and
his family and the natural hurt and emotional upset which was bound
to flow from its frustration, and weighs these against the lack of law-
ful or moral justification for the interference by the defendants, it
is easy to see that the total of 1500 dollars was but a pittance. The
trial court, however, was snply following the rule of allowing little
or no damages in such cases.
Where traditional actions for damages are involved, the law is
67 No. 2867, App. Dep't Super. Ct. San Francisco, March 28, 1965. This is one of
the test cases involving article 1 section 26 now pending in the California Supreme Court
as S.F No. 22019, certification filed April 6, 1965.
68237 A.C.A. 594, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965).
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clear that a plaintiff may recover for pain and suffering which result
from the physical consequences of emotional shock.69 Ordinarily, the
amount of such damages is left to the common sense and experience
of the trier of fact, and appellate courts will not interfere unless the
record shows passion, prejudice or corruption in fixing the award.70
The jury or trial judge, as the case may be, may use their personal ex-
periences and knowledge in determining the amount of compensa-
tion for such damages. 71 It has even been held that a trial judge may
call upon the personal experiences he has had with a similar injury
in arrivmg at the amount of damages to be awarded in a particular
case.
72
In State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff,73 threats of physical
punishment were held sufficiently outrageous to constitute a tech-
mcal assault and to justify an award of 4,000 dollars. The physical
consequences of the threats were minor. By way of comparison, it
is difficult to comprehend that 4,000 dollars damages for threats of
pumshment to occur at an indefinite future date is not excessive,
while 250 dollars should be the limit of reasonable compensation to
a woman who has suffered the present insult and outrage of racial
discrimination.74
In a negligence case where a tenant suffered severe fright and
shock leading to an "acute psychotic break," damages in the sum
of 100,000 dollars were sustained.75 Even if a jury in a civil rights case
with similar injury could be induced to make such an award, there
is little hope to be gleaned from the appellate reports to indicate
that a trial judge would allow it to stand or that it would be affirmed
on appeal.
It is not possible to ascertain from the decided cases involving
civil rights violations that any fixed standard for measurement of
damages has been evolved, and the criteria applied in other tort ac-
tions have simply not been used. It is unfortunate, but perhaps true,
that when judges and juries who are not members of minority groups
69 Paul v. Rodgers Bottling Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 680, 685, 6 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871
(1960). The emotional shock here resulted from seeing a dead mouse in a soft drink.
See also Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 17 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1961).70 Sassano v. Roullard, 27 Cal. App. 2d 372, 81 P.2d 213 (1938).
71 Thompson v. Simonds, 68 Cal. App. 2d 151, 162, 155 P.2d 870, 875 (1945).
72People v. Miller, 41 Cal. App. 2d 252, 258, 106 P.2d 239, 242 (1940).
7338 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
74The court m Siliznoff did indicate that the question of excessiveness is at the
discretion of the trial court, 38 Cal. 2d at 340-41, 240 P.2d at 287, but it is the propriety
of the trial courts' determinations in the civil rights cases that is being questioned.
75 Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772, 373 P.2d 860 (1962).
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attempt to call upon their own experiences to measure and fix the
amount of damages in civil rights cases, not having had a comparable
experience, they operate in a vacuum. They can identify easily enough
with a woman who has been yelled at by a money collector's agent
or with a tenant who has fallen through the steps of an apartment
house. They or their wives may even have experienced such episodes
themselves. A refusal to rent a house or serve a meal because of race
or color, however, is not a prospect the average juror or judge can
realistically visualize. After all, one's sense of values is inevitably
shaped by those experiences he either has shared or has reason to
view as being within the realm of possibility for humself.
There still seems to be a question as to whether under the Unruh
Act a plaintiff may recover punitive damages as provided for in Civil
Code section 3294, or whether he is limited in regard to punitive dam-
ages by the provision of Civil Code section 52 for recovery of "actual
damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto."
The new language is exactly the same, except as to amount, as that
found in section 54, now repealed, which provided that recovery
should be "actual damages, and one hundred dollars in addition
thereto."
In Greenberg v. Western Turf Assn., 6 the Supreme Court of
Califorma was called upon to pass on the propriety of an allowance
of punitive damages in a case arising under the now repealed section.
The trial court had instructed the jury that, if it found it proper,
punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 could be awarded.
In approval, the Califorma Supreme Court said:
It is contended that as the statute itself provides that the plaintiff
for the wrongful act may recover one hundred dollars in addition
to his actual damage, tis was error, in that the law itself had fixed
the amount, and thus liquidated the punitive damages which may be
permitted, and that the instruction thus authorized the jury to give
additional punitive damages in excess of those permitted by the law.
We think, however, that this objection is not well taken. The statute,
it is true, allows to the plaintiff one hundred dollars in addition to
his actual damage. This sum is unquestionably a penalty which the
law imposes, and which it directs shall be paid to the complaining
party But it will be noted that it is a penalty imposed in any and
every case, whether the rejection or refusal of admission was or was
not done under circumstances of oppression or violence It does
not, therefore, exclude the operation of Section 3294 of the Civil
Code, but that section runs current with it, and, notwithstanding
the imposition of the one hundred dollars penalty, in any proper
76 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903).
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case a plaintiff may recover damages, given by way of example for
the personal indignity and wrong wich have been put upon bUM. 77
When the Unruli Act was passed, the Legislature certainly knew
of the above interpretation given to the statute by the courts. Had it
desired to change the rule it could have done so, but it did not. There
seems, therefore, to be no basis for an assumption that the identical
language has given the new statute a more restrictive meaning.
The question of the propriety of punitive damages in a case aris-
ing under the Health and Safety Code sections dealing with publicly
assisted housing should in no way be a vexing one.78 The language
of the code merely calls for damages not less than 500 dollars. Ap-
parently, there is no rational basis for any difference in the measure
of damages between the two statutes, and the difference in language
may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the primary concern
in the Unruh Act was expansion of coverage, so that the old language
of Civil Code section 54 relating to damages was simply upgraded by
150 dollars, while the Hawkins Act (also, now, the Rumford Act)
was new legislation, and its framers wanted to place a floor under
the level of damages, while avoiding anything which might appear
to be a ceiling. As a practical matter, both compensatory tort damages
under Civil Code section 333379 and punitive damages under section
32940 are proper. The difference between them is that theoretically,
at least, the actual damages under the Unruh Act could be as little as
one dollar, while by command of statute such damages under the
Hawkins-Rumford Act must always be at least 500 dollars. Under the
Unruh Act, to whatever amount is assessed under Civil Code sections
3333 and 3294 there must be added the sum of 250 dollars. A legal ver-
dict under the Hawlans-Rumford Act could be only for the statutory
minimum of 500 dollars. It would be a rare case indeed, however, in
which such a verdict would be justified, because racial discrimination
77 Id. at 363, 73 Pac. at 1051. In the recent case of Fiberboard Paper Products Corp.
v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 227 Cal. App. 2d 675, 721, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64, 92-93
(1964), it was held that even if the conduct of defendant is provoked by plaintiff pu-
nitive damages may still lie. Provocation may reduce, but does not necessarily eliminate,
punitive damages.
78 CAL. HEaT & SAFETY CoDE §§ 35700-44.
79 "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contact, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will com-
pensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3333.
80 "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arsing from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plain-
tiff, m addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3294.
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is almost always actuated by the considerations and manifested by
the intentional conduct which punitive damages were invented to
prevent.
Where punitive damages are sought, evidence of the wealth of
the defendant is not only material8 but necessary, in order to be
certain that pumshment results.82 An assessment of the sum of 1000
dollars in punitive damages against a millionaire might be a joke,
but against a poor wage earner it nught be an economic catastrophe.
In order not to effect a miscarriage of justice the trier needs to know
something about defendant's threshold of economic pam. That factor,
coupled with knowledge concerning the degree of violence, malice
or oppression inherent in the conduct of defendant, in light of possible
provocation by plaintiff, afford a proper measure for punitive damages.
Contrary to an indication by the Califorma Supreme Court in the
Greenberg88 case, the reactions and feelings of plaintiff as a response
to discrimination are properly a part of his compensatory damages
under Civil Code section 3333 and should in no way influence the
amount of punitive damages. The purpose of punitive damages is
to pumsh defendant and to deter others by the example made of hn. 84
If consideration of the effect upon plaintiff of the outrageous conduct
of defendant is permitted, double recovery for the same wrong will
inevitably result.
Cases not Arising Under Statute
James v. Marnship Corp.,85 may generally be considered to be
authority for the proposition that racial discrimination in Califorma
is against public policy and is hence actionable, even in the absence
of statute. It would be fallacious, however, to accept this claim without
critical examination. While the James case does state that the prac-
81 McMann v. Wadler, 189 Cal. App. 2d 124, 11 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1961).
82Bardy v. Copeland, 74 Cal. 1, 15 Pac. 307 (1887).
83 140 Cal. 351, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903).
84 Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 172 Pac. 412 (1918); Butler v. Allen, 73 Cal.
App.. 2d 866, 167 P.2d 488 (1946); Perrine v. Paulos, 100 Cal. App. 2d 655, 224 P.2d
41 (1950); CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294. In the case of Pleasants v. North Beach & M. R.R.,
34 Cal. 586 (1868), punitive damages were not allowed to a Negro woman who was
refused service on a street car. The court said the refusal was courteous. It is submitted,
however, that CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 does not make courtesy, ostensible or real, the
test. Oppression, fraud and malice on the part of defendant are specified in the statute,
and it would certainly seem to be oppressive and malicious on the part of a common
carrier to pass up a passenger solely because of race. The required malice may be express
or implied, and thus means no more than an intent to harm.
8525 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
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rice of racial discrimination by a labor union enjoying the privileges
of a closed shop are "contrary to the public policy of the United
States and this state,"86 it obviously did not so characterize all racial
discrimination. The union was arbitrarily closed to Negroes who
wished to join, and the court held that "it may no longer claim the
same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal
associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does not
merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to
work for a. living."87
It thus appears that the James case is merely authority for the
proposition that, in the absence of statute, the courts will prevent
racial discrimination where fundamental rights are deprived. Even
though the question of the effect of a monopoly held by the labor
union over the labor supply is discussed at length, that the case did
not turn on that point was made clear by the same court in Williams V.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers,88 where it is said, "The failure
to allege a monopoly of labor in the entire locality is not fatal to
plaintiffs' cause of action insofar as the authorities relied upon m the
James case are concerned."89
In Williams, the court also clearly expressed the view that courts,
even in the absence of statute, have full authority to afford necessary
protection "where persons are subjected to certain conduct by others
which is deemed unfair and contrary to public policy "0 Not all
discriminatory conduct, however, is actionable under this rule, and
it has been said that there is no public policy in this state against
racial discrimination in general.91
8o Id. at 739, 155 P.2d at 339.
87 Id. at 731, 155 P.2d at 335.
8827 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946).
s9 Id. at 590, 165 P.2d at 905.
0 Ibid.
91 Reed y. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d
633 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1959); Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton Inc.,
182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960). These cases denied a public policy
against racial discrimination m certain commercial enterprises (a private school and a
health gym), and one of the responses to them by the legislature was the revision of CAL.
Crv. CODE § 51 so as to make it cover all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever, instead of merely applying to certain specified places of public accommodation and
other places like them.
If public policy may be ascertained from the decisions of the California Supreme
Court and legislation on the subject, it seems incorrect to say that there is no public
policy against racial discrimination in this state. The legislature has, over the years,
repeatedly enacted statutes designed to effect this policy. See statutes cited notes 62
and 63 supra. It would be more accurate to say that the policy exists only where funda-
mental rights are involved.
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A recent case of first impression, Duff v. Engelberg,92 recognizes
the right of a Negro plaintiff to recover compensatory and punitive
damages from a defendant who, because of the race or color of plain-
tiff, induced a potential seller to withdraw from the sale of real prop-
erty because the defendant did not want Negroes in the neighbor-
hood. The plaintiff secured specific performance of the contract to
sell and, in addition, was awarded compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against the defendant whose interference induced the breach.
The transaction did not concern a business establishment or publicly
assisted housing, and hence no civil rights statute was involved. The
unsuccessful appellants argued that our law does not permit a vendee,
in addition to specific performance of an executory contract to pur-
chase realty and consequential and incidental damages against the
reluctant vendor, to recover compensatory and punitive damages
against a third party who induced the vendor not to go forward with
the sale. The court rejected the argument that specific performance
and incidental damages against the vendor made plaintiff whole,
for the reason that those damages arose out of breach of the contract
and did not compensate plaintiff for those arising out of the mten-
tional tort committed by the one who induced the breach.
The result here seems sound, and, no matter how the question
of the constitutionality of Proposition 14 is decided,93 this case may
prove valuable where neighbors bring pressure upon white vendors
to induce them to refuse to sell to Negroes or where real estate
brokers encourage racial discrimiation. Even though this particular
case involved breach of an executory contract already in existence,
the principles announced in it would seem to support a tort action
against one who, for reasons of race or color, induces a person not to
enter into the contract in the first instance. In each situation the con-
duct of the tortfeasor would have the elements of intent and lack
of justification referred to by Prosser94 and found persuasive by the
court. If the tort remedy is separate from, and in addition to, any
action on the contract, perforce, it should not depend upon the execu-
tion and breach of that contract. Conduct which induces one to refuse
to enter into a contract may have effects just as harmful as that which
induces breach of an existing agreement. In addition, wherever the
discriminatory conduct is unfair and against public policy within the
92237 A.C.A. 594, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965).
93 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
9 4 PRossEm, TORTS § 123 (3d ed. 1964).
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meaning of James v. Marnship Corp.,9 5 there is further reason for
allowing a civil action for damages.
There is no indication that damages were sought in the James
case, but there is no reason they could not have been allowed. In
fact, both compensatory and punitive damages would seem warranted
under the facts of the case. This and other leading civil rights cases
seem to have been brought as class actions to vindicate a statutory
or constitutional prmciple,96 not to win damages. It is submitted,
however, that constitutional principles and money damages are not
necessarily incompatible.
Civil Actions for Damages Under Federal Law
On April 9, 1866, prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, Congress enacted a series of civil rights laws97 designed to
effectuate the purposes of the thirteenth amendment, which had been
ratified on December 18, 1865. These civil rights statutes were re-
enacted after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and since
that time have generally been viewed as an effort by Congress to
create statutory machinery for the vindication of rights conferred by
that amendment.9 8 The original act expressly provided that an injured
party night bring an action at law or in equity for the redress of his
grievances.9  The right of ultimate review by the Supreme Court of
9525 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).9OJames v. Marnship Corp., supra note 95; William v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946); see Jackson v. Pasadena City
School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
97 REv. STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1965), purported to confer equal
rights under law, and provides that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other."
REv. STAT. § 1978 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1965) provides: "All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."
98 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
99 The remedy for deprivation of rights is provided in REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1965), which reads: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."
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the United States was guaranteed by a provision that such review may
be had without regard to the sum in controversy 100
A congressional effort to deal with the threat to Negro freedom
by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan resulted in the enactment of what
appears on its face to be a rather strict anti-conspiracy law,10 ' de-
signed to prevent any two or more persons from going upon the high-
way or upon the premises of another for the purpose of depriving any
person of the equal protection and immunities of the law or for the
purpose of preventing any public officer from secunng to all persons
the equal protection of the law The remedy for violation of the
section is a civil action for damages. It is also provided in another
section 10 2 that every person who has knowledge of such a conspiracy,
has the power to prevent it or to aid m its prevention, and neglects
to do so shall be liable for all injuries resulting to the victim.
There appears to be no' limit to the civil damages recoverable
under any of these sections, except that if the victim dies and a de-
fendant is sued only because he had knowledge of the wrong about
to be committed and had power either to prevent it or aid in its pre-
vention and did not do so, there is a maximum limit of 5000 dollars
upon any recovery 0 3 So far as is known, the 5000 dollar limitation
was placed in the statute in 1871 and has remained unchanged. Since
it appears that in almost one hundred years there are no reported
cases of successful action under that provision, the propriety of the
limitation is academic.
Federal civil statutes designed to protect civil rights have now
been so restricted and emasculated by the courts that in every in-
stance "state action" under the fourteenth amendment must be shown
before they become operative.'0 4 Violence against persons solely be-
cause of race or color, by individuals not acting under color of state
law or authority, is actionable only in the state courts. Mr. Justice
Jackson, in the case of Collins v. Hardyman,105 stated the rule as
follows: "Such private discrinmation is not inequality before the law
unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give
sanction or sanctuary for doing so."1' °
10018 Stat. 337 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1964).
101 tEv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1965).
102 REv. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1965).
103 Section 1986 provides that the personal representatives may recover damages,
not exceeding $5000.
104 E~maSoN & HABm%, PormcAL Am CivrL RIcHTS IN m UNrE STATES 81
(2d ed. 1958); Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965).
105 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
106 Id. at 661.
[Vol. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The private discrmination in point consisted of the disruption of
a meeting of a political club called to discuss the Marshall Plan by a
group with opposing political views. The gravamen of the complaint
was that this conduct constituted a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs
of their right to assemble and to petition the Government for redress
of their grievances. The Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal of the
case by the district court on the ground that the complaint did not
state a clan under section 1985(3) because no state participation or
sanction of the conduct was alleged. Commentators have criticized
Collins v. Hardyman because it places the unnecessary and restrictive
requirement of state action upon a federal statute designed to reach
conduct by private individuals. 0 7 We agree with that criticism, but
until the Collins case is overruled, there is no reason to expect suc-
cess in a damage suit under the federal statutes unless state action
is involved.
Collins v. Hardyman incorrectly and unnecessarily assumed that
only the fourteenth amendment could be looked to as the source of
the authority of Congress to enact section 1985(3) The complaint
in that case made no reference to the amendment. As pointed out in
the dissenting opinion, the right alleged to have been violated was
the first amendment right of freedom peaceably to assemble and to
petition the federal government for redress of grievances. The statute
was enacted not only under the authority of the fourteenth amend-
ment, but was also sanctioned by the first amendment. The majority
opinion in Hardyman recognizes that the preamble to the statute as
originally enacted stated that it was "an Act to enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other purposes." Clearly, one such other purpose could
have been to make actionable conduct of private individuals, not
acting under color of state law, which deprives other individuals of
rights protected by the first amendment. We believe that the proper
inquiry of the court should have been whether Congress had authority
from any constitutional source whatsoever to enact a statute which
left out any requirement that the action sought to be prohibited be
done under color of state law The majority opinion raised this ques-
tion but did not resolve it, except by saying that a statute so enacted
would not be without constitutional difficulty because of the powers
reserved to the states. It does not seem reasonable to hold that the
tenth amendment prohibits Congress from protecting federal rights
from invasion by private individuals not acting under color of state
107 Authorities cited note 104, supra.
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law If Congress is without such power the question arises as to whether
there is an obligation upon the states to protect federal rights which
the federal government itself is powerless to protect. A further ques-
tion may well be an inquiry as to the source of any such state obliga-
tion and the results of a state's failure either to assume or execute it.
Speaking of the inherent power of Congress to enact laws to
pumsh conspiracies of private individuals to interfere with the right
of citizens to vote in federal elections, the Supreme Court of the
United States has said: "If it has not this power it is left helpless be-
fore the two great natural and historical enenies of all republics,
open violence and insidious corruption."OS
It is not without significance that the Civil Rights Act of 19 57 i°9
is made applicable to any person, "whether acting under color of law
or otherwise," who unlawfully interferes with the right of a person
to vote in a federal election. If Congress has the power to reach the
activities of private persons who intimidate or threaten persons at-
tempting to exercise the right to vote, it would seem to follow that
the right peaceably to assemble and petition the government is also
subject to statutory protection by Congress. There seems to be no
reason why the latter rights should enjoy an inferior degree of pro-
tection, cr no protection at all, when assault is made upon them by
persons not acting under color of state law
In 1956 the Eighth Circuit expressly held that a school district,
standing in loco parentis to school children, could enjoin private in-
dividuals from interfering with efforts to desegregate the public
schools.11° There the court said that plaintiffs had a federally pro-
tected right to be free from any deliberate and intentional act pre-
venting discharge of federally imposed obligations. In that case no
one asserted a clai of state action by defendants. As private per-
sons, defendants were enjoined. If one has a federally protected
right to perform his federally nposed obligations, he should also
have a federally protected right to enjoy his federally conferred
privileges.
Most successful civil actions for damages under the federal stat-
utesii will involve unlawful acts by state and local officials. Cases
arising out of charges of police brutality are certainly cogmzable
108 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884).
10971 STAT. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1965), amending REv. STAT. § 2004
(1875).
110 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
Mi REV. STAT. 1979, 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1965).
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under these statutes because the requisite state action is inherently
present. Unless the officer is acting under color of law, however, his
conduct is the same as that of any other person and remains a matter
for action in state courts only
In Monroe v. Pape,112 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a cause of action could be brought under title 42, U.S. Code
section 1983 against city police officers for false arrest. Prior to that
decision, such cases had regularly been dismissed by federal district
courts.i It thus appears that Monroe v. Pape has given victims of
police brutality or msuse of state power a federal weapon to supple-
ment any state remedies available. 1 4 In many instances action in a
state court may be preferable, but where a plaintiff desires to have
his civil action tried in a large metropolitan area rather than in the
small city where everyone knows the officer defendants, resort to an
action under title 42 U.S. Code, sections 1983 or 1985(3), might well
be a valuable alternative.
Since the federal civil rights statutes do not specify what kind of
damages may be recovered, it must be assumed that both compen-
satory and punitive damages are proper in a suit under them, and
both should be sought in cases of intentional violation of civil rights.
It is well settled that cases brought under these statutes sound in
tort. In Monroe v. Pape"s Mr. Justice Douglas stated that these
statutes "only should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for- the natural consequences of his ac-
tions." When they are so read both compensatory and punitive tort
damages are possible. 6
Even under federal law, there is a doctrine which clothes local
and state officers with mununity from civil liability so long as they
act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity 117 A recent case allowing
a civil action to proceed against an Arizona county prosecutor fol-
lowed this rule, but the allegations stated that defendant did not act
112 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
113 Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961). The court stated that had it
not been for Monroe v. Pape it would have dismissed a suit against city policemen as
]ust another tort action cognizable only m a state court.
114 See Crvm RicHTs AND LmER=ns HANDBOOK § 304 (Ginger ed. 1963).
115 365 U.S. at 187.
116 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333, providing for compensation, and § 3294, allowing award
of punitive damages. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 101 F.2d 774 (3d
Cir. 1939), approved award of punitive damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act.
117 Smith v. Dougherty, 286 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1961); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d
709 (1st Cir. 1954).
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in his quasi-judicial role, and it was held that he thereby lost his
immunity ii8 It is doubtful that this case will open up any substantially
new or effective methods for vindication of civil rights by damage
actions. The truth of the matter is that a plaintiff will seldom be able
to prove that a prosecutor or judge acted other than in a quasi-judicial
or judicial capacity It is one thing to plead a case, but quite another
to prove one. None of the cases allows recovery for mere judicial
error of a judge or negligence of a prosecutor. What is required for
success is so much more that the difference in quantum of proof
necessary m any given case is qualitative, not quantitative.
Since the civil rights struggle is often characterized by civil diso-
bedience and demonstrations, it is only natural that many people are
arrested, and some are roughed up m the process. Some of them may
have valid civil actions for damages, but it must be remembered that
under both federal" 9 and state 20 law, acquittal of the offense with
which one is charged is a prerequisite to success in many tort actions
arising out of criminal procedures. This is certainly true of the tort
of malicious prosecution, but acquittal of the criminal charge is not
a condition precedent to a civil action for damages for such acts of
violence as assault and battery, or for unreasonable detention without
judicial authority
Congress carefully avoided providing the remedy of a civil action
for damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Under Title II of the
Act, only an injunction may be sought by the aggrieved party Em-
ployment discrimination may be redressed, if conciliation fails, by an
action for injunction brought by the Attorney General under Title VII
or by a person aggrieved.122 Back pay may be awarded, but no other
damages are allowed.
Sunmary and Conclusion
There is a wide range of situations in which civil actions for
damages will lie under state law for the violation of civil rights. The
courts and the public, however, must be awakened to the problem
of damages, for the feeling that the demal of civil rights results only
in minor, or even nominal, damages is widespread. Much of the blame
for this state of affairs may well be placed upon the lawyers who try
118 Robichaud v. Ronan, No. 19, 663, 9th Cir., October 8, 1965.
119 Watson v. Delvm, 167 F Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
120 Oppenheimer v. Tamblyn, 162 Cal. App. 2d 293, 327 P.2d 574 (1958).
12178 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1965); Rachhin, The Civil Rights Act of
1964: A Hard Look, 2 LAw n-T TRANsrrioN Q. 67 (1965).
1.2278 Stat. 261 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), (b) (1964).
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these cases. The production of expert testimony on the question of
the psychological effects of an abrupt confrontation with racial dis-
crimmation might bring a sharp upturn in the amount of these awards.
A criminal arrest must be shown to be a major, permanent event m
the life of every arrested party In arrest cases the simple expedient
of subpoenaing the police files is often not done. The fingerprint card
and the "mug shot" are permanent records which no acquittal can
erase; copies are always sent to the state bureau of criminal identifica-
tion and to the FBI. Evidence that most job applications ask ques-
tions about prior arrests is also important. In every civil action for
damages for false arrest or malicious prosecution, these facts should
be stressed to the judge and the jury if an adequate award is to be
secured.
Perhaps some Negro school child should seek substantial damages
under title 42 U.S. Code section 1983 against school officials who
insist upon relegating him to inferior, segregated schools. A few
such suits might force school officials to take more seriously their
duty to provide equal educational opportunities for all children. Dam-
ages, both compensatory and punitive, could be sought for past harm,
and injunctive relief could be sought for the prevention of future
detriment. The permanent harm done to the minds of little children
by racial segregation, de facto or otherwise, certainly ought to be
cogmzable in an action for damages.
For all practical purposes, we must consider civil actions for dam-
ages against private persons under the Federal Civil Rights Act to
be outside the realm of litigation in which success may be anticipated.
Collins v. Hardyman has seen to that. We wonder, however, whether
the situation is as hopeless as it seems. If the plaintiffs in a suit under
title 42 U.S. Code section 1985(3) are members of the NAACP,
CORE, or the Southern Christian Leadership Movement, and pri-
vate persons in Alabama or Mississippi deny them the right peaceably
to assemble, and state officials do nothing about it, would the federal
courts follow Collins v. Hardyman? We think not. Inherent in the
Collins doctrine is the assumption that state law will pumsh offenders
and protect victims in such a situation. A strategically brought case
could perhaps lead to an explicit limitation upon, or even an over-
ruling of, the Collins precedent.
December, 1965] CIVIL RIGHTS DAMAGES

